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Abstract
We try to demonstrate how economists may engage in research on comparative
politics, relating the size and composition of government spending to the political
system. A Downsian model of electoral competition and forward-looking voting
indicates that majoritarian￿as opposed to proportional￿elections increase com-
petition between parties by focusing it into some key marginal districts. This leads
to less public goods, less rents for politicians, more redistribution and larger gov-
ernment. A model of legislative bargaining and backward-looking voting indicates
that presidential￿as opposed to parliamentary￿regimes increase competition be-
tween both politicians and voters. This leads to less public goods, less rents for
politicians, less redistribution, and smaller government. We confront these pre-
dictions with cross-country data from around 1990, controlling for economic and
social determinants of government spending. We ￿nd strong and robust support
for the prediction that the size of government is smaller under presidential regimes,
and weaker support for the prediction that majoritarian elections are associated
with less public goods.
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Looking across the countries of the world, we observe a wide variation in the size
of government and in the scope of its activities. The white bars in Graph 1 de-
pict total central government expenditures for a number of democratic countries.
The data are expressed as a share of GDP and averaged over 1988-92. Countries
are grouped by development level￿OECD membership, or not￿and, among de-
veloping countries, by continent. Within groups they are ordered by IMF codes.
Evidently, expenditures vary a great deal, both within and between groups. Much
of this variation re￿ects di⁄erences in socio-economic determinants of government
expenditure. But large di⁄erences remain, even when we control for economic
and social variables suggested by economic theory and found to have explanatory
power in previous empirical studies. The black bars in the graph show the resid-
uals from a regression of expenditures on (the log of) per capita income, (the log
of) openness to international trade, the share of population above 65, and a mea-
sure of ethno-linguistic fractionalization. The controls account for a substantial
share of the variation (about 60 per cent), and the di⁄erences across groups of
countries more or less disappear. But striking di⁄erences within groups remain,
and residuals of plus or minus 10% of GDP are not uncommon. The results are
very similar if the set of controls is expanded to include other determinants of
spending.1
Insert Graph 1 about here
We observe a similar degree of variation in the scope of government. Graph 2
is constructed in the same way as Graph 1. But it illustrates the cross-country
variation for a measure of spending on public goods, namely the sum of spending
on transportation, education and order and safety. This variable also refers to
central government, and it is expressed as a share of GDP on average between
1988-92. The controls used to generate the residuals are the same, except that
fractionalization is replaced by a measure of centralization in total government
spending. Again, the di⁄erences and the residual variation are striking.
1Section 5 discusses the data, the sample of countries, and alternative speci￿cations at more
length.
2Insert Graph 2 about here
How can we explain this variation? There are many possible, and complemen-
tary, answers to this question. In this lecture, we advocate building a positive
theory of the size and scope of government on the basis of comparative politics.
That is, we ask whether and how di⁄erent political institutions a⁄ect the size and
composition of government spending. In particular, we study two fundamental
features of political institutions: the electoral rule, contrasting majoritarian and
proportional electoral systems, and the regime type, contrasting presidential and
parliamentary regimes.
Despite a large literature on the size of government, the speci￿c question of
how these political institutions in￿uence public spending has been neglected un-
til recently. Traditional public ￿nance, with its normative approach, has not
even posed the question. The literature on public choice and political economics
has provided important insights on the determinants of the size of government￿
di⁄erent branches of this literature are surveyed in Frey (1983), Mueller (1989),
Mueller (1997) and Persson and Tabellini (1998). But most of this research has
not systematically investigated the link between political institutions and public
spending, and to the extent that it has, the focus has been on features other than
the electoral rule and the regime type.2
Political scientists have done much more work comparing political systems, and
comparative politics is indeed a well-established sub￿eld in political science. A
large body of theoretical, empirical and descriptive research concentrates precisely
on electoral rules and regime types. But this work is typically con￿ned to the
analysis of political phenomena, such as how the electoral rule a⁄ects the number
of parties, or how the regime type a⁄ects the frequency of political crises, or
protests by the citizens.3
2Von Hagen and Harden (1996), Alesina and Perotti (1996), and Inter-American Development
Bank (1997) contrast alternative budgetary institutions, but their main focus is on budget
de￿cits, not on the size or composition of spending. Roubini and Sachs (1989) and Grilli,
Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) discuss electoral rules and party structures of OECD countries,
but again with regard to public debt accumulation. There is a also a literature on ￿scal
federalism and the size of government, which is surveyed in Inman and Rubinfeld (1997) and
Persson and Tabellini (1998). Finally a small but interesting literature discusses how direct
democracy shapes the size of government (see for instance Pommerehne and Frey (1978)).
3Recent classics on comparative politics include Bingham Powell (1982), Lijphart (1984),
Taagepera and Shugart (1989), Shugart and Carey (1992), and Cox (1997). Myerson (1998)
also discusses this literature.
3In this lecture, we try to exemplify how economists may pursue an approach
of comparative politics. Like the political scientists, we focus on electoral rules
and regime types. But we go beyond the political system, using simple theory to
derive speci￿c hypotheses regarding policy choice. We then take some of these
hypotheses to the data.
We start by formulating (in Section 2) a simple model of public ￿nance.
Elected politicians can tax the voters and choose how to allocate the revenue
among three alternative uses: to rents bene￿ting themselves, to a public good
bene￿ting all the voters, or to redistributive transfers bene￿ting a more narrow
group of voters.
Two central assumptions are that politicians are self-interested, and that voters
are rational and fully informed. In particular, politicians would like to raise a lot
of revenue and spend it on rents for themselves. This view of politics may strike
some readers as too cynical. But we think it is a useful methodological approach,
since it poses the right questions: What makes politicians behave in the interest
of voters? And how does this depend on political institutions? Of course, we
are not the ￿rst to address these questions. A common opinion is the so called
￿Chicago view￿, that political competition between sel￿sh politicians leads to the
implementation of e¢cient policies.4
An important theme of our lecture is that this view of the political process
is too optimistic. Even with fully informed voters, political equilibria typically
exhibit two political failures. First, public goods are under-provided because
of redistributive transfers to powerful groups of voters. Intuitively, politicians
neglect the interests of some voters, as they only need to please a subset of the
voters to win the elections. Second, politicians earn positive rents for themselves,
at the voters expense. Intuitively, politicians enjoy considerable discretion once
in o¢ce, because electoral promises are only veri￿able or enforceable in some
dimensions of policy. What a politician does, once in o¢ce, will therefore not
only re￿ect his electoral promises, but also his view of the world. As competing
politicians di⁄er in their ideologies or along other important dimensions, they
remain imperfect substitutes. Because of this imperfect substitutability, rents are
not fully dissipated in the course of electoral competition.
Another important theme of our lecture is that the extent of these political
failures depends on political institutions. Intuitively, both the electoral rule and
the regime type determine the scope and the intensity of political competition. In
general, those regimes that promote more intense competition imply policy choices
4See in particular Stigler (1972), Wittman (1989).
4that internalize the bene￿ts and costs of fewer voters. Those regimes therefore
bring about less public good provision. But more competition also brings about
smaller rents for the politicians.
We develop these ideas in two di⁄erent models of political behavior. In Section
3, we study a traditional Downsian model of two-candidate electoral competition.
We label it pre-election politics, because all the action takes place before the
elections. The model assumes that politicians can make binding commitments to
policy platforms ahead of the election. Forward-looking voters then choose the
policy platform most favorable to them. In this setting, we ask how the electoral
rule in￿uences policy choices, contrasting majoritarian and proportional elections.
The central di⁄erence is that majoritarian elections make politicians concentrate
their competition for votes in certain ￿marginal￿ electoral districts. Typically,
these districts consist of more mobile voters, who can be more easily swayed
by electoral promises. Hence, electoral competition is sti⁄er under majoritarian
elections, as politicians try to please ￿swing voters￿ in the marginal districts,
rather than swing voters in the population as a whole. Among other things, this
leads to more targeted redistribution, at the expense of public good provision. The
results in this section draw on earlier insights by Lindbeck and Weibull (1987),
Svensson (1997), Lizzeri and Persico (1998), and Polo (1998).
In Section 4, we turn to a very di⁄erent model of political behavior. We
label it post-election politics, as we drop the unrealistic assumption of binding
commitments ahead of the election. Here, incumbent politicians set policy once
they are in o¢ce. And elections serve the purpose of holding these politicians
accountable to backward-looking voters. This setting is appropriate for doing
comparative politics on a di⁄erent set of institutions, namely those that allo-
cate decision-making authority. The political constitution is thus viewed as an
￿incomplete contract￿, specifying who has the right to propose, veto, or amend
policy, and in which dimensions. In this setting, we contrast two regime types,
presidential and parliamentary. The central insight is that a presidential system
entails sti⁄er competition between di⁄erent voters, as well as between di⁄erent
politicians. Politicians compete more ￿ercely among themselves because they are
held directly and separately accountable by the voters. Compared to a Parlia-
mentary regime, this limits the scope of collusion. As coalitions among politicians
are more unstable, voters end up competing more ￿ercely for the redistributive
transfers than in a parliamentary regime. These features imply less spending on
every budget item in presidential regimes and, hence, to a smaller size of govern-
ment. The results in this section were originally derived in a series of joint papers
5with Gerard Roland (Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997), (1998a), (1998b)).
In Section 5, we then confront the speci￿c hypotheses generated by these two
models with cross-country data. Using the theory, we classify the democracies
in our sample according to their electoral rule and regime type. On the whole,
the empirical results are very encouraging. We ￿nd strong and robust evidence
that, ceteris paribus, governments are indeed smaller in presidential regimes as the
theory suggests. We also ￿nd some support for the hypothesis that majoritarian
elections are associated with lower supply of public goods.
Section 6 ends with some remarks on where to go next.
2. A public ￿nance model
Consider a society with three distinct groups of voters, denoted by i =1 ; 2 ; 3 :
Each group has a continuum of voters with unit mass. The preferences over





i+H ( g ) : (2.1)
Here, ci is private consumption of group i; t is a common tax rate, bi is a transfer
payment to group i; and g is the supply of (Samuelsonian) public goods, evaluated
by the concave and monotonically increasing function H(g): Thus, we assume
that income gross of taxes is equal to one for all individuals, that taxes are non-
distorting and that the tax rate is the same for every group.
The public policy vector q is de￿ned by:
q =[ t;g;r;fb
ig] ‚ 0;
where all components are constrained to be non-negative. Any feasible policy





i + g + r: (2.2)
The component r re￿ects (endogenous) ￿rents￿ to politicians and it is a deliber-
ate object of choice. As discussed in Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997), we
can think of r as an outright diversion of resources, such as corruption or party
￿nancing, or more generally as an allocation of resources that bene￿ts the private
6agenda of the politicians but appears as an ine¢ciency for the voters.5 When an
assembly of elected politicians take the policy decisions (as in Section 4), these
diversions may bene￿t some politicians more than others, in which case r must
be disaggregated. We assume diversions to be associated with some transaction
costs (1 ¡ ￿), such that only ￿r bene￿t the politicians. From the voters￿ view-
point, however, these rents constitute pure waste. Thus, not only do we assume
politicians to be sel￿sh, but we also assume them to have an opportunity to take
advantage of their power. Naturally, equilibrium rents could be very small. But
the aspiration of politicians to extract these rents may still shape their decisions
in other policy dimensions.
To make the public ￿nance problem more interesting, we could extend the
model with a labor supply choice distorted by taxation. Below, we comment on
how our results would change in this richer formulation. But even this simple
model entails a very rich micro-political problem. There are three con￿icts of
interest: between di⁄erent voters (over the allocation of redistributive transfers,
fbig), between voters and politicians (over the size of rents, r); and between
di⁄erent politicians (over the distribution of these rents among themselves). As
we shall see, di⁄erent political systems alter the scope and intensity of these
con￿icts, basically by inducing more or less competition between politicians or
voters.
3. Pre-election politics
In this section, we consider the solution of our policy problem from a traditional
angle, namely as the outcome of Downsian electoral competition. Two o¢ce-
motivated candidates make binding commitments to policy platforms in the elec-
tion campaign, and rational voters select the policy platform most favorable to
them. In formulating this model, we draw on the insights of several earlier con-
tributions. As in Lindbeck and Weibull￿s (1987) work on redistribution, we use
a model with probabilistic voting to handle electoral equilibrium when policy is
inherently multi-dimensional.6 As in Myerson (1993), Grillo and Polo (1993),
5Svensson (1997) analyzes a more elaborate model where ine¢ciencies arise as high costs for
public projects. These ine¢ciencies bene￿t bureaucrats in the public administration who, in
turn, are monitored more or less tightly by the politicians.
6Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), in turn, build on probabilistic voting models by Hinich, Led-
yard and Ordershook (1972) and by Coughlin and Nitzan (1981), among others. See also our
survey, Persson and Tabellini (1998).
7Svensson (1997) and Polo (1998), we allow for endogenous rents in addition to
the traditional assumption of pure o¢ce motivation. And as in Lizzeri and Per-
sico￿s (1998) study of redistribution versus public goods, we use our model to
investigate di⁄erent electoral incentives.
Already at the outset, we want to emphasize that our model￿at best￿
captures only one of several possible e⁄ects of di⁄erent electoral systems. In par-
ticular, we hold the party structure ￿xed, ignoring theoretical arguments as well
as empirical evidence for a larger number of parties under proportional elections.
Our excuse is pragmatic; we simply do not know how to analyze multi-dimensional
policy consequences of electoral competition in a multi-party setting.
3.1. General features
Consider two parties or candidates, labeled A and B: Before elections take place,
these parties commit to policy platforms, qA and qB. They act simultaneously
and do not cooperate. The platform of the winning party is implemented. As we
emphasize below, the precise conditions for winning depend on the electoral rule.
C o n s i d e r ,s a y ,p a r t yA: When announcing its policy platform, it maximizes the




where R denotes the (exogenous) ￿ego rents￿ associated with winning the elec-
tions, and pA denotes the (endogenous) probability that A wins, given qA and
qB:
Why is the election outcome uncertain, when platforms are chosen? We as-
sume that the two parties are intrinsically di⁄erent in some dimension other than
the announced policies. One can think of these intrinsic di⁄erences as re￿ecting
￿ideologies￿ or, the personal features of leading party candidates. Thus, we are
implicitly assuming that parties cannot really make binding commitments over
all policy dimensions, so that some aspects of their future behavior will re￿ect
their intrinsic features. Voters evaluate ideology in di⁄erent ways. Speci￿cally,
letW i(q) denote the preferences of voters in group i over government policy. That
is, Wi(q)is the indirect utility obtained by substitution of (2.2) into (2.1). Then







8where the term (– + ￿j) S 0; re￿ects voter j0s ideological preference for party B:
This term includes two components; ￿ is common to all voters and ￿j idiosyn-
cratic.
We can think of – as the general popularity of party B: We assume that – is






. Thus, the density of
this distribution is given by d and the expected value of – is zero. Furthermore,
– is realized between the announcement of the party platforms and the election.
This assumption means that parties announce their platforms under uncertainty
about the election outcome. Clearly, such uncertainty is very plausible. It is also
technically convenient; as we shall see below, it smooths the optimization problem
facing the parties.
The variable ￿j re￿ects the individual ideology of voter j: The distribution of
￿j di⁄ers across groups. These distributions are uniform on
£
¡ 1
2si + ￿i; 1
2si + ￿i⁄
;
i =1 ;2 ;3 :They are fully characterized by two parameters, ￿i and si; and groups
di⁄er over both. In other words, groups di⁄er in their average ideology, captured
by the group-speci￿c means ￿i: But they also di⁄er in their ideological homogene-
ity, a higher density si being associated with a more narrow distribution of ￿j:
We make speci￿c assumptions about these di⁄erences in distribution. Suppose
we label the three groups according to their average ideology ￿i: „ ￿1 < „ ￿2 < „ ￿3:
Then, we assume that group 2 also has the highest density: s2 >s 1;s 3: This is
the substantial assumption. For convenience, we also assume that ￿2 =0and
that ￿1s1+ ￿3s3 =0 : 7
The meaning of these assumptions is illustrated in Figure 1, where we have
drawn the distributions for ￿j in the three groups. Each of the three groups has
an ￿ideologically neutral￿ voter with ￿j =0 ;and the further to the right we go
in the ￿gure, the more likely we are to ￿nd a voter who will vote for party B:
Assume, for concreteness, that – =0and, furthermore, that the two candidates
have announced the same policies qA = qB: In this event, the ideologically neutral
voters with ￿j =0in each group are indi⁄erent between the two candidates. We
label these indi⁄erent voters ￿swing voters￿. Every voter with ￿j below (above)
0 ￿nds it optimal to vote for party A (party B).8 As the ￿gure illustrates, our
7We assume that the parties know these group-speci￿c distributions when they announce
their policy and that the electoral uncertainty derives entirely from uncertainty about the com-
mon component, –: Alternatively, we could have generated the uncertainty by doing away with
– and instead assume the group means ￿i to be random.
8We assume that a swing voter, being indi⁄erent between the parties, tosses a coin when
deciding how to vote.
9assumptions imply that the group which on average is ideologically neutral also
has the largest number of ideologically neutral voters.9 It is natural to think of
this group as consisting of ￿middle class￿ voters.
Insert Figure 1 about here
We can also use this ￿gure to illustrate how the parties evaluate the announce-
ment of di⁄erent policies. Suppose party A contemplates a deviation from a com-
mon policy announcement qA = qB: Such a deviation alters the number of votes
party A can expect, by changing the identity of the swing voters. For example, a
lower tax rate t or more public goods g bene￿t voters in all groups symmetrically.
Taken separately, such measures thus push the identity of the swing voter in all
g r o u p st ot h er i g h tb yt h es a m ed i s t a n c e ,s a yt o￿ 0, and party A can expect to
capture the voters between 0 and ￿0 in all groups (as the expected value of – is
equal to zero). Similarly, more transfers to group 1; ￿nanced by less transfers
to group 3, shift the swing voter in group 1 to the right and the swing voter in
group 3 to the left by the same distance (recall that we assume the groups to have
t h es a m es i z e ) .T h i sr e d i s t r i b u t i o ni m p l i e san e tg a i ni nv o t e s ,a st h e r ea r em o r e
swing voters in group 1 than in group 3; that is, s1 >s 3:Finally, higher rents r
mean losing votes in all three groups, and a lower probability of winning. As the
announced policies must respect the budget constraint, the two parties e⁄ectively
trade o⁄ votes for votes, or rents for votes, when designing their platforms.
As a ￿nal preliminary, we de￿ne …A;i,t h ev o t es h a r eo fp a r t yAin group













where the expression within square brackets is a formal de￿nition of the swing
voter in group i: Clearly, the vote share of party B in group i is given by 1 ¡
…A;i: Note that, from the point of view of both candidates, …A;i is a random
variable, since it is a transformation of the random variable – capturing the average
popularity of party B:
9We will sometimes ￿nd it more convenient to talk about the number of voters instead of
the density, even though we are formally assuming that the distributions are continuous.
103.2. Proportional elections
We ￿rst use our model of pre-electoral politics to study policy outcomes under
an electoral rule corresponding to proportional representation. Speci￿cally, we
study a very stylized case where (as in the Netherlands) there is only one voting
district, comprising all the voters in the population. Winning the election thus
corresponds to obtaining more than 50% of the total vote. Under this electoral












where the probability refers to the random variable –:By (3.3) and our previous


















i si=3 is the average density across groups. By symmetry, party B0s
probability of winning is (1 ¡ pA):
Given our distributional assumptions and the concavity of H(g); a unique
equilibrium exists. One immediate feature of this equilibrium is that both A and
B choose the same policy. Formally, they face the same maximization problems,
as pB =( 1¡p A)and as qA and qB enter (3.5) symmetrically, but with opposite
signs. Intuitively, they have the same sel￿sh preferences and possess the same
technology for converting policy promises into expected votes.
To characterize the equilibrium policy, we maximize party A0s objective func-
tion (3.1) with regard to qA; taking qB as given. Exploiting (2.1), (2.2), and (3.5),
and evaluating the resulting ￿rst-order conditions at the point qA = qB; we obtain
the conditions which must hold at an equilibrium.
A ￿rst result concerns the pattern of redistribution to the voters. The equi-
librium involves positive redistribution to group 2 only; that is, b2 > 0; and
b1 = b3 =0 :T h i ss t a r kr e s u l tf o l l o w sa st h e r ea r em o r es w i n gv o t e r si ng r o u p2 ;
by our assumption that s2 >s 1;s 3;and as the marginal utility of private consump-
tion is constant. Thus both parties target their redistribution programs towards
the middle class, because this group contains the most responsive voters.10
10An alternative assumption producing similar results would be to assume that voter turnout
di⁄ers systematically across groups. In this case, the two parties would unambigously target the
group with the highest turnout rate￿see Str￿mberg (1998) for a theoretical treatment of this
case (and empirical work suggesting that US groups (regions) with higher voter turnout indeed
obtained larger transfers in federal New Deal programs).
11The equilibrium supply of public goods then follows from the optimal trade-o⁄






i¢H g( g ) ; (3.6)
where 1 refers to the marginal utility of private consumption (see 2.1) and su-
perscripts refer to groups. Intuitively, one more unit of redistribution for the
middle-class group can be achieved by cutting the supply of the public good by
the same amount. This means a gain of votes proportional to s2 ¢ 1 in group
2 (captured by the LHS), but a loss of votes in every group i proportional to
si ¢Hg(g) (the RHS). It is optimal for the two parties to equate the marginal gain
of votes to the marginal loss of votes.
A similar tradeo⁄, between t and b2; pins down the optimal tax rate. An
additional unit of redistribution to the middle-class group can also be achieved by
raising the tax rate by one third on all voters. This leads to the complementary
slackness condition:
s







= s [t 6 1]:
Here, the gain of votes in group 2 always exceeds the loss, as s2 = Maxi[si]: Since
taxes are not distortionary, the optimum is a corner solution with t =1 :
Clearly, the more responsive is the middle class group (the higher is s2), the
higher is the opportunity cost of public goods. Thus, the two parties ￿nd it
optimal to announce a lower supply of public goods and to increase transfers
to this powerful group. That is, we have a comparative statics result that will
prove useful later, when comparing electoral rules: the larger is the frequency of
ideologically neutral middle class voters (the higher is s2), the smaller is public
good provision in equilibrium, and the bigger are the transfers to middle class
voters. With distortionary taxes and an interior solution for t,a ss 2increases, the
equilibrium tax rate also goes up.
To ￿nd the optimal rents implied by the two candidates￿ platforms, consider
￿nally the tradeo⁄ between r and b2: The complementary slackness condition,
corresponding to this margin is:






[r 1 0]: (3.7)
The left-most expression in (3.7) re￿ects the marginal bene￿ts of extra rents,
whereas the remaining expressions re￿ect the inframarginal rents times the greater
12probability of losing the election. As is evident from the condition, equilibrium
rents r can well be positive. As p is equal to 1
2 in equilibrium, this is more likely
when R (the exogenous rents) are low. The reason why electoral competition does
not eliminate rent seeking is that the parties are only perfect substitutes for swing
voters, but not for any other voters. This implies that
dp
dr is negative, but ￿nite.
Equilibrium rents are thus larger, the more imperfect substitutes the two parties
are; that is, the smaller is the number of swing voters. Hence, we have a second
comparative statics result; a larger number of ideologically neutral voters (a higher
s2) reduces equilibrium rents in an interior optimum: Finally, rents are lager, the
higher is the variance in electoral outcomes (the lower is d). Higher variance
implies that the expected vote share is not very sensitive to policy anyway; given
this, the candidates ￿nd it optimal to take a greater risk by insisting on larger
rents.
3.3. Majoritarian elections
What if elections are instead conducted under plurality rule (￿rst past the post)
in single-candidate electoral districts? Speci￿cally, assume that there are three
electoral districts and consider the following electoral rule: winning the elections
(and setting policy) requires winning at least two districts. One can interpret
this setting as a parliamentary election, in which two competing parties have
candidates in all three districts. The party who wins in two districts has a majority
in the assembly and can thus implement its pre-announced policy. Alternatively,
one can interpret it as a Presidential election (as in the US), where a candidate
only needs a majority of the votes in a majority of the districts (rather than a
majority of the population) to be elected President. We continue to talk of parties
(rather than candidates) throughout this section, so implicitly, we adopt the ￿rst
interpretation which also forms the basis for the empirical work to follow.
We start with a simplifying assumption: the three electoral districts coincide
with the three groups in the population. We then show that all comparative
politics results easily generalize if groups and districts do not completely overlap.
Under majoritarian elections, existence of equilibrium is not guaranteed without
further assumptions. Basically, we must assume that the ideological bias towards
party A in group 1 and towards party B in group 3 are large enough; that is, the
group-speci￿c means ￿1 and ￿3 are su¢ciently distant from zero. If this is the
case, an equilibrium exists where A and B announce equal policies and where the
entire competition takes place in the ￿marginal district￿ made up of the middle
13class (group 2) voters. Party A wins district 1 with large enough a probability and
loses district 3 with large enough a probability, so that neither candidate ￿nds it
optimal to seek voters outside the marginal district; recall that only two districts
are required for winning the election.11
Under these assumptions, the relevant expression for party A0s probability of














Compared to (3.5), the expression in (3.8) depends only on what happens in
11We want to show that A does not want to seek victory in district 3 (party A is already win-
ning district 1 with higher probability than district 2, which party A wins with 50% probability
in the proposed equilibrium).
Let a » denote a deviation to district 3. A deviation does not pay for party A if:
~ pA;3[R + ￿~ rA;3] •
1
2
[R + ￿rA;3]: (F1)




Moreover, by the de￿nition of pA;i and noting that if groups coincide with districts a deviation
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• „ ￿3: (F4)
Clearly, for „ ￿3 high enough, this necessary and su¢cient condition is satis￿ed.






Are (F4) and (F5) compatible with each other? They are, if:




Similar conditions on „ ￿1 insure that party B does not want to deviate from the proposed
equilibrium, either.
14the marginal district, district 2: The other districts are neglected, because there
party A is either very likely to win or very likely to lose. We may then follow
the same steps as in the previous subsection to characterize the policies in a
convergent electoral equilibrium. Obviously, only the middle class￿the sole group
in the marginal district￿gets all the redistribution. Furthermore, it is optimal for
both candidates to propose more redistribution than under proportional elections.
Intuitively, the bene￿t to the parties of such redistribution is the same as under
proportional elections, namely the marginal votes gained from the middle class
voters. But the costs are smaller, as the parties now do not internalize the votes
lost in the non-marginal districts.
As a result, it is still optimal to set the tax rate at its maximum: t =1 .
With distortionary taxes, however, the lower costs of taxation would have led to a
higher tax rate. The sharper incentives to redistribute also show up in the optimal
supply of public goods, as the optimal tradeo⁄ between b2 and g now ful￿lls:
s
2 = s
2 ¢ Hg(g): (3.9)
By (3.9), Hg(g)=1 ;whereas by (3.6) Hg(g) < 1 under proportional elections.
Thus the supply of public goods is smaller under majoritarian elections.
Finally, equilibrium rents are also smaller. To see this, note that the condition
for b2 vs. r now becomes:
p￿ 6 ¡[R + ￿r]¢
dp
dr
=[ R+￿r]¢d [r 1 0]: (3.10)
The condition is identical to (3.7), except that d replaces s2d
3s in the expression
for ¡
dp
dr: Since s2 < 3s =
P
si; higher rents make the candidates lose votes
at a higher rate in majoritarian elections. Intuitively, the electoral competition
is sti⁄er, as it is now focused on the district with the most responsive voters.
Because the election outcome is more sensitive to policy, the two parties become
more disciplined and forego some prospective (endogenous) rents.
What happens to these comparative politics results, if we relax the extreme
assumption about perfect overlap between groups and districts? Qualitatively,
the answer is ￿nothing￿, provided that the middle-class group 2 is a ￿dominant
group￿ in one of the districts.12 Let the population share of group i in district k
be denoted by ni;k: Then, group 2 is a dominant group in one of the districts if
12The conditions for existence of equilibrium become stricter as we relax the assumption of
perfect overlap.
15n2;k > 1
3 and n1;k;n 3;k < 1
3 in some k: I ft h em i d d l ec l a s sd o m i n a t e sd i s t r i c t2 ,i n
this sense, electoral competition will take place only in district 2. Furthermore,
district 2 is an asymmetric replica of the whole population, where group 2 receives
more weight. As illustrated in Figure 2, this asymmetry has the same e⁄ect as
a higher relative density s2
3s of group 2 under proportional elections, the result of
which was discussed in subsection 3.2; more redistribution towards group 2, less
public goods, and less rents.13
Insert Figure 2 about here
The central comparative politics results of this section can be succinctly sum-
marized. Majoritarian elections make electoral competition sti⁄er, by concentrat-
ing it in some key marginal districts. The result is more targeted redistribution
in a more narrow constituency. With majoritarian elections, we should therefore
not only observe more targeted redistribution towards the politically in￿uential
middle class, but also a lower supply of public goods and smaller rents, ceteris
paribus. Extending the model with distortionary taxes, we also get the prediction
that majoritarian elections should be associated with larger governments.
Before turning to the evidence, however, we discuss a di⁄erent model of polit-
ical behavior, which focuses on institutions governing policy formation.
4. Post-election politics
We now drop the unrealistic assumption that binding commitments to policy
platforms can be made ahead of elections. In the real world, there is no outside
authority that can enforce campaign promises. And even if there was (or if repu-
tational incentives were strong enough), many policy-relevant states of the world
are non-describable or non-veri￿able. Precise state-contingent policy promises can
thus not be formulated or would not be believed by the voters. This suggests that
political constitutions are analogous to incomplete contracts; they allocate deci-
sion rights to di⁄erent actors. Policy choices are made by incumbent politicians,
once in o¢ce, so the elections select a decision maker, not a state contingent
policy. In particular, voters hold politicians accountable for their performance
through retrospective voting.
13Formal results are available from the authors upon request.
16In this setting, it is natural to redirect the focus onto the institutions governing
policy formation. Such institutions determine which control rights are associated
with which political o¢ce, and hence lay out the rules for legislative bargain-
ing among politicians. We ask how these rules￿the political regime￿resolve the
con￿icts between voters and politicians, contrasting presidential and parliamen-
tary regimes, drawing on results by Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1998a and
b). That analysis, in turn, builds on several strands of earlier work. As in Barro
(1973) and Ferejohn (1986), voters limit the agency problems associated with rent-
seeking politicians by holding them accountable through retrospective voting. As
in Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997), the rules for separation of proposal (and
veto) powers shape the con￿icts between di⁄erent politicians. And as in Diermeier
and Feddersen (1998), the rules for executive formation and dissolution shape the
coalition formation within the political system.
4.1. General features
We consider a majoritarian electoral system throughout. As in Section 3.3, there
are three equally-sized districts. Each of them elects a single politician. We now
assume a more strongly dominant group of voters in each district: in our earlier
notation ni;k > 1
2 for each group i in one of the districts k: The preferences of
this dominant group determine the election result and we need not distinguish
between districts and groups.
Policy choices are made by the three incumbent legislators in legislative bar-
gaining, before elections take place. These politicians aim at maximizing the sum





As previously, pi is the probability that politician i is re-elected, while R denotes
the exogenous ￿ego-rents￿ associated with winning the election. Moreover, ri
denotes the current endogenous rents of politician i: This adds an additional policy
dimension, namely the allocation of total rents r among incumbent politicians and,
accordingly, a con￿ict of interest among incumbent politicians. Note that ri is
enjoyed irrespective of the election result, while R is conditional on winning the
elections. Hence, there is an implicit intertemporal dimension: R refers to the
future, while ri refers to the current period.14
14Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1998a) demonstrate how the value of re-election R can be
endogenized in an in￿nite-horzion model, as the present discounted value of expected future
endogenous rents.
17We now abstract from ideological or personal attributes of di⁄erent politicians.
In each district, the incumbent legislator thus faces an opponent, who is identical
in the eyes of the voters (the terms –+￿j appearing in (3.2) are dropped). Voters
in each group coordinate on optimal retrospective voting strategies. Speci￿cally,
voters in district i choose optimally a reservation utility $i for re-electing the
incumbent legislator. That is, they vote according to:
p
i =
1 if wi ‚ $i
0 otherwise: (4.2)
While coordinating within the group, the voters do not cooperate across groups.
Thus, the reservation utility $i chosen by group i i sab e s tr e s p o n s et ot h er e s e r -
vation utility $j simultaneously chosen by group j 6= i: Moreover, we assume
throughout that voters have full information and that they take the political
power of their legislator into account when formulating their voting rule.
In this setting, the incumbent politicians have signi￿cant discretionary powers
to claim rents for themselves. But given their objectives in (4.1), the voting
rule (4.2) presents them with an intertemporal tradeo⁄; if the politicians extract
too high rents today, they cannot satisfy the voters￿ demands and must forego re-
election and rents tomorrow. The incentive scheme inherent in this accountability
mechanism is less e⁄ective, however, if the decisive politician has access to more
revenue, as this increases the temptation to appropriate the revenue for his private
agenda.
4.2. Presidential regimes
We start by analyzing ￿presidential￿ regimes. Such regimes have two impor-
tant institutional features. First, e⁄ective decision making power is split among
di⁄erent politicians, who are separately and directly accountable to the voters.
This strengthen the ￿checks and balances￿ against political abuse and collusion
among politicians. Second, the maintenance of such powers does not depend on
a con￿dence vote, or more generally on majority support in the assembly. This,
in turn, weakens the incentives to maintain stable coalitions in the assembly.
Speci￿cally, valuable proposal powers are not￿like in the parliamentary regimes
below￿concentrated in a cabinet-style executive, which must rely on continued
con￿dence of a majority in the legislature. Instead, the executive typically derives
its mandate directly from the voters. The separation of powers may be between
the president and Congress, or between di⁄erent politicians in Congress.
18For example, the US ￿ts both the aforementioned features; it has a directly
elected president, and proposal powers over (economic) legislation are dispersed
across powerful Congressional committees. As a result, legislative coalitions are
rather unstable; we often observe di⁄erent Congressional majorities forming over
di⁄erent policy issues, and relatively little party discipline. France, on the other
hand, has neither of these features. Despite its popularly elected president, the
proposal powers over (economic) legislation are concentrated in the cabinet, the
survival of which depends on continued support from a majority in the National
Assembly. For this reason, France is not classi￿ed as a Presidential, but a Parlia-
mentary, democracy in the empirical analysis below.
We formulate a simple legislative bargaining game that seeks to capture these
features. Di⁄erent politicians, directly accountable to the voters, are assigned
very sharp proposal powers over di⁄erent policy dimensions. One of these, at;
proposes the budget size. The other, ae; proposes the budget allocation among
alternative uses. One may think of these two politicians as the ￿tax committee￿
and the ￿expenditure committee￿.15 A sequential ￿budget procedure￿ provides
checks and balances and ensures e⁄ective separation of powers. Any majority can
be formed to approve these proposals, and di⁄erent majorities can be formed on
each of the separate proposals. The speci￿c timing is illustrated in Figure 3.
Three politicians, i =1 ; 2 ; 3share o¢ce at the start of the period. Two of
them are exogenously chosen to act as at and ae: Having observed the role of their
legislator, voters in all districts simultaneously formulate their reservation utilities,
$i: Then at makes a ￿take it or leave it￿ proposal on the budget size, 3t: This
proposal is voted upon by congress, namely by at;a eand the third politician. Any
majority is free to form. If the proposal is approved by at least two politicians, it
is implemented. Otherwise an exogenous status quo tax rate, ts; in enacted. Next,
ae proposes an allocation of expenditure, subject to the budget determined in the
previous node of the game. Again, a vote is taken, and any majority can form.
An exogenous default allocation (unattractive for the voters) is implemented if
the proposal is rejected. Finally, having observed everything that has taken place
before, voters decide whether or not to reappoint the incumbent politician in their
district.
15We thus abstract from the existence of a president with veto or proposal powers, but these
could be introduced without changing the thrust of the main results. We could also further split
the proposal power over spending, giving some agenda-setting privileges to each of the three
legislators, without changing the main results.
19Insert Figure 3 about here
This game has a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. We now discuss its
properties, without formally deriving any of the results. In doing so, we focus on
the central trade-o⁄s that must be resolved by the optimal choices of incumbent
legislators and voters. A formal derivation is provided in Persson and Tabellini
(1998) and, for a more general in￿nite horizon model, in Persson, Roland and
Tabellini (1998a).
Consider the allocation of spending proposed by ae, for a given budget size.
Getting the support from a legislator typically requires spending additional re-
s o u r c e s ,e i t h e ro nr e n t sf o rh i m ,o ro nt r a n s f e r sf o rh i sd i s t r i c t( s ot h a th ec a n
satisfy his re-election constraint), or both. Hence, ae seeks a minimal winning
majority, namely the support of only one legislator for his spending proposal.
Moreover, he seeks the support of the legislator who is ￿cheapest to buy￿, namely
whoever demands the least either for himself or for his voters. This pits the other
two voting districts against each other: the voters in the districts i 6= ae pay taxes
anyway, but receive zero transfers if they are left out of the winning coalition.
Hence, they become engaged in a ￿Bertrand competition￿ for the spoils allocated
by ae: To increase the chance of their representative being included in the winning
coalition, they reduce their reservation utilities $i down to the point where they
drive the demand for redistribution down to zero. Any equilibrium thus has:
b
i =0 ;i 6 = a e :
This property leaves ae free to please his voters. Namely, all redistributive trans-
fers go to his district (bi = b if i = ae): And the public good is traded o⁄ against
redistribution, one for one. This leads to severe under-provision of the public
good, since only one third of the social bene￿ts are internalized. Speci￿cally, in
equilibrium:16
Hg(g)=1 :
What about equilibrium rents? The voters would like to keep them down to
a minimum. The best they can do is to set their reservation utility, so that:
￿r+2 R=￿3 t: (4.3)
16A social optimum, ful￿lling the Samuelson criterion would have Hg(g)=1
3:Note that the
equilibrium coincides exactly with the equlibrium public goods provision in the majoritarian
electoral system studied in Section 3.3.
20The right-hand side of (4.3) is the maximum joint payo⁄ to ae and his coalition
partner if they go for the short-run option of allocating the entire budget to rents
for themselves, only to be kicked out of o¢ce. The left-hand side of (4.3) is the
joint payo⁄ to ae and his coalition partner if they decide to seek reappointment and
please their voters. In this case, they get current rents ￿r plus future exogenous
rents 2R (as both politicians are re-elected). Thus, voters cannot push the endoge-
nous rents r below the value implied by (4.3). If the value of reappointment R is
not very high, then by (4.3) equilibrium rents can be positive. Intuitively, such
positive equilibrium rents re￿ect the contract incompleteness and the resulting
discretion enjoyed by politicians, once they are in o¢ce. Concerning the alloca-
tion of rents among politicians, it is optimal for ae to exploit his agenda-setting
power, nailing the junior coalition partner to his status-quo payo⁄.
Last, what about equilibrium taxes? Recall that taxes are proposed by the
taxation committee, at 6= ae: T h ev o t e r so ft h i sl e g i s l a t o rd on o tb e n e ￿ tf r o m
additional tax revenue beyond what is necessary for ￿nancing the equilibrium
supply of the public good and minimum rents. Additional taxes go either to
redistribution for district i = ae; or to rents for the politicians. These voters thus
want to keep taxes at a minimum. Likewise, legislator at has only limited claims
on tax revenue. He is therefore pleased to satisfy his voters and go along with
low taxes, so as to earn re-election. In other words, neither at; nor the voters
re-electing him, are residual claimants of a larger budget. As a result, equilibrium
taxes are relatively low and unambiguously:
t<1 :
That is, voters exploit the separation of powers to discipline politicians and enforce
a small size of government.
We can summarize these results as follows. Presidential regimes induce strong
competition among the voters, implying redistribution towards a minority. This,
in turn, raises the opportunity cost for public goods which are severely under-
provided.. Voters not bene￿ting from the minoritarian redistribution demand low
taxes. Presidential regimes, with their separation of powers, also entail strong
competition between incumbent politicians. This con￿ict can be exploited by the
voters to limit the agency problem. Together, these features imply relatively low
taxes and a small size of government.
214.3. Parliamentary regimes
We now turn to ￿parliamentary￿ regimes. There are two central features of such
regimes: proposal powers over legislation rest mainly with the government, and,
government survival depends on the support of a majority in the assembly. These
two features give the majority coalition strong incentives to stick together; a
break up could lead to a government crisis and result in the loss of valuable pro-
posal powers. In the language of Diermeier and Feddersen (1998), parliamentary
systems exhibit legislative cohesion, a tendency towards stable coalitions in the
assembly. This could be re￿ected either in party discipline￿that is, cohesion be-
tween di⁄erent factions within a party￿or in the stability of coalitions made up
of di⁄erent parties.
To capture these features, we modify the previous game in two important
respects. First, we assign veto rights to the two members of the majority coalition
over the ￿nal policy package. Second, a costly outcome (i.e. a government crisis)
is triggered for the majority coalition if the veto is exercised. As a result, the
agenda setter is not free to seek support from the legislator who is ￿cheapest
to buy￿, but needs to please his coalition partner. The timing is illustrated in
Figure 4. Two di⁄erent (exogenously appointed) legislators, labeled at and ae;
control the proposals on taxes and expenditures. One may think of these as
cabinet ministers. No vote is taken, however, until both proposals have been
made. A veto by any of the coalition partners triggers a government crisis, which
leads to a low expected utility both for the politicians and the voters.17 These
assumptions approximate the proposals being made by cabinet ministers in a
budget preparation phase inside the government, with a vote of con￿dence being
attached to the ￿nal budget proposal.
Insert Figure 4 about here
What does the equilibrium look like? As bargaining power here is more
equally shared among the coalition partners, the ￿nal allocation splits welfare
17The given expected utilities following a government crises can be generated as continuation
values in a subgame, with either a caretaker government or with a new government formation
phase, as in Diermeier and Feddersen (1998) and in Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1998a).
Obviuosly, the precise rules for government break-up and the procedure after a government
crisis a⁄ects the bargaining power of the coalition partners and therefore the legislative outcome;
Baron (1998) formally models some of the alternatives and their consequences.
22more equally among voters in the majority coalition, as well as among their
politicians. In particular, the equilibrium allocation of redistributive transfers
and public goods must be jointly optimal for voters in the majority coalition.
This generally leads to redistribution in favor of a majority, and the bene￿ts of
the public goods for the majority are internalized. That is, we have:
b
i ‚ 0;i = a t ;a e: (4.4)
1
2
• Hg(g) • 1
with Hg(g)=1
2 if bi > 0 for both i = at;a e:
The equilibrium is not unique, however. Since voters set their reservation
utilities simultaneously, welfare can be split among these in many di⁄erent ways.
That is, bilateral monopoly now replaces Bertrand competition in the redistribu-
tion game between voters. All the equilibria satisfy (4.4). Hence, in all of these
(except one at most) public-good provision is higher than in the Presidential sys-
tem, and in most of these redistributive transfers bene￿t a majority of voters.
Voters in the majority now bene￿t from higher taxes, at the expense of the
minority. Both legislators in the coalition are pleased to go along with high taxes.
As a matter of fact, even if the voters wanted lower taxes, the legislators would
not deliver them. The lack of e⁄ective separation of powers in the Parliamentary
regime implies that politicians in the coalition compete less ￿ercely over rents. Un-
like in the Presidential regime, higher tax revenue brings about larger equilibrium
rents for both politicians, not just for ae. Thus, in equilibrium, at proposes
t =1 ;
a e is pleased to accept the proposal, and voters in their districts are pleased as
well.
Higher tax revenue brings about larger endogenous rents. By analogy with
(4.3), total rents now satisfy:
￿r+2 R=￿3 ; (4.5)
which implies a higher r than in the Presidential system, since the right-hand side
of (4.5) is larger than that of (4.3), while R and ￿ are the same.
We can summarize the central comparative politics results from our analysis of
post-election politics. Compared to presidential regimes, parliamentary regimes
have less competition among the voters. Redistributive transfers bene￿t a major-
ity, rather than a minority. The supply of public goods is higher, as the politicians
23are induced to internalize the bene￿ts for a larger coalition of voters. Parliamen-
tary regimes also have less competition between the politicians who make policy
proposals. The agency problem between voters and their representatives thus be-
comes more pronounced, as manifested in larger equilibrium rents. Altogether,
a majority of voters and politicians bene￿t from higher taxes, so parliamentary
regimes are associated with larger governments.
We close our theoretical analysis with a ￿nal remark. Despite the di⁄erent as-
sumptions, there is an important analogy between this comparative politics result
a n dt h a to b t a i n e di nt h em o d e lo fp r e - e l e c t i o np o l i t i c s .B o t hi nt h ep r e - e l e c t i o n
politics and in the post-election model, political institutions determine the extent
of competition among voters or politicians. More competition always brings about
a lower supply of public goods as the bene￿ts of fewer voters are internalized. In
fact, the more competitive systems, namely the majoritarian electoral rule and
the presidential regime, both imply that only a third of the voters￿ preferences
get internalized in the policy decisions. They therefore bring about exactly the
same supply of public goods (satisfying Hg(g)=1 ), even though the mechanisms
leading to this outcome are di⁄erent. In both cases, more competition also brings
about smaller rents (as the agency problem is less harmful to the voters). This
analogy suggests that from a normative point of view, political competition can
be good or bad: it may be good for public good provision, but bad for the agency
problem. Hence, a universally optimal constitutional form may not exist. Design-
ers of constitutional reforms may face a tradeo⁄, and di⁄erent societies may be
better o⁄ with one or another institutional feature. This conclusion is consistent
with the large varieties of political constitutions that we observe in the real world.
We exploit such observed variety in the next, empirical, section.
5. Evidence
In this section, we present some empirical evidence on the size and scope of govern-
ment. In particular, we confront some of the predictions from our two models with
cross-country data. We start by brie￿y describing our sample and our classi￿ca-
tion of political systems. Next, we turn to residuals from cross-country regressions
of the size of government and public goods provision onto socio-economic control
variables, asking whether these residuals di⁄er systematically across regime types
and electoral rules. Finally, we present results from regression analyses, where
characteristics of the political system enter among the independent variables ex-
plaining government expenditure.
245.1. The sample
The previous models predict how the electoral rule and regime type in￿uence the
size and scope of government in democratic countries. As we want to exploit
variation with regard to the political system, and at the same time hold various
socio-economic variables constant, we deliberately choose a generous de￿nition
of democracy so as to increase the sample size. Speci￿cally, we only include
countries scoring between 1 and 5, on average, over 1985-90, according to Gastil￿s
well-known index of political rights. This selection rule produces a sample of 64
countries, depicted by non-white entries on the world map in Figure 5.18 Note that
the dating of the democracy information, which is dictated by the availability of
government expenditure data, excludes the new democracies in Eastern Europe.
Insert Figure 5 about here
The theoretical model of majoritarian elections assumes plurality rule in single-
candidate districts. We therefore classify all countries electing their legislatures
according to those rules as majoritarian. This amounts to a total of 29 countries,
indicated by dark shade on the map. The other 35 countries in the sample are
classi￿ed as proportional, indicated by light shade. We have also devised a more
continuous measure, attempting to capture the degree of proportionality (see be-
low). Our primary source for data on the number of candidates per district is Cox
(1997).
According to the theory, presidential regimes have two important features.
First, there is e⁄ective separation of powers between the executive and legislative
branches of government. Second, maintenance of proposal powers by speci￿c de-
cision makers does not depend on the support of a majority in the assembly. To
discriminate between parliamentary and presidential democracies in our sample,
we consider: (i) the degree of authority of a popularly elected president over the
cabinet; (ii) the extent to which the survival of the executive and assembly pow-
ers are separate. Despite a popularly elected president, a country is classi￿ed as
parliamentary, if the president has little authority over the cabinet, or if execu-
tive survival depends on maintained support from a majority in the legislature
18O nas c a l ef r o m1t o7 ,G a s t i l( 1987) classi￿es countries scoring 1-2 as ￿free￿, and those
scoring 3-5 as ￿semi-free￿. Borderline cases in our sample include countries such as Chile,
Paraguay, Egypt, and Malaysia.
25throughout the election period. Also, presidential powers to dissolve the legisla-
ture weaken separation of powers between the two bodies, and thus contribute to
classifying a country as parliamentary.19 The primary source for this information
is Shugart and Carey (1992, ch. 8). Altogether, we end up with 39 parliamentary
democracies, indicated by solid on the map, and 25 presidential democracies, in-
dicated by striped on the map. Many, but not all, presidential democracies are
found in Latin America. A complete and detailed data set of our regime types,
electoral rules and other data is under preparation and will be made available
soon.
As noted in the Introduction, government size is measured as total expendi-
tures of central government in percent of GDP, averaged over the period 1988-92.
The primary data source is IMF￿s Government Financial Statistics,b u tw eh a v e
also collected data from other sources. We rely on data for central government,
rather than general government, since they are available for a larger number of
countries. Such data admittedly do not take variation in decentralization to local
governments into account, a problem we try to remedy by including measures of
centralization among our control variables. Anyway, the theory assumes decisions
to be under centralized political control, which better ￿ts central (rather than
general) government expenditures. Data on public goods expenditure are not di-
rectly available. We create such measures by aggregating data on expenditure
categories which, a priori, should have a high public-good content. Thus, our
measure of public goods is the sum of expenditures on transportation, education
and order and safety, also in percent of GDP. We also experiment with broader
measures of spending on public goods.20
Finally, we use a number of socio-economic control variables, found in previous
empirical studies to be correlated with the size of government. When explaining
the size of government, our most parsimonious list of controls, denoted XB in the
Tables below, includes the following variables: (i) the log of per capita income,a s
the level of development could in￿uence the voters preferences for private versus
public consumption, as well as the availability of tax bases, as conjectured by the
so called ￿Wagner￿s law￿ (cf. Mueller (1989)); (ii) the log of openness, measured
19Following the theory in this way, means that France￿where the government, holding pro-
posal powers over economic policy, is dependent on the legislature￿is classi￿ed as parliamentary,
whereas Switzerland￿where the coalition government is not dependent on the legislature￿is
classi￿ed as presidential.
20We also tried to include defense spending in our public goods measure. Military spending
varies greatly over countries, however, and we did not succeed in ￿nding good control variables
to pick up the underlying geopolitical and historical factors explaining this variation.
26as the log of the sum of exports plus imports in % of GDP, as suggested by the
earlier empirical work by Cameron (1978) and Rodrik (1998) and also to capture
the greater availability of tax bases in less developed open economies (cf. Goode
(1984)); (iii) the share of the population above 65, which determines spending
on pensions and health (see, e.g., the empirical ￿ndings in Lindert (1996); (iv)
a measure of ethno-linguistic fractionalization, to capture the idea that political
interaction is more di¢cult in more fractionalized countries which could a⁄ect
public policy decisions (see, in particular, the empirical work by Alesina, Easterly
and Baqir (1997) and by Easterly and Levine (1997)).
When explaining public good provision, the list of parsimonious controls, now
denoted ZB; is de￿ned as XB above, except that the index of fractionalization is
replaced by: (iv) centralization of government spending (measured as expenditures
of central government divided by expenditures of general government), as the
assignment of tasks to various levels of governments could di⁄er across countries
(Panizza (1997) also used this variable). Below, we comment on what happens
when these sets of regressors are expanded to include other variables.
5.2. Analysis of residuals
Graphs 1 and 2 in the Introduction display the residuals generated by regressions
of the size of government and public good provision against the parsimonious
controls XB and ZB de￿ned above.21 What is the pattern of these residuals
across di⁄erent political systems?
21Speci￿cally, the residuals for government size have been generated by the regression
SIZE = ¡14:08(¡0:73) + 0:02(0:01) ¢ INCOME+
8:01(4:23) ¢ OPEN +1 5 2 : 9(3:51) ¢ OLD
¡0:06(¡1;24) ¢ ETHNO;
where the regression coe¢cients (t-statistics in brackets) refer to the variables in XB (which
appear in the same order as they are described in the text above); this regression is based on
54 observations and has an adjusted R2 of 0:57.
Similarly, the residuals for public goods have been generated by the regression:
PUB = ¡4:20(¡0:60) ¡ 0:64(¡0:86) ¢ INCOME +
3:27(3:81) ¢ OPEN +7 : 22(0:44) ¢ OLD
+0:04(1:23) ¢ CENTR;
where the coe¢cients refer to the variables in ZB; this regression is based on 40 observations
and has an adjusted R2 of 0:46:
27Before answering this question, it is useful to recall the hypotheses suggested
by the theory. Consider ￿rst the size of government. The post-election politics
model of Section 4 suggested that presidential regimes should be associated with
smaller governments, ceteris paribus. We should thus observe predominantly neg-
ative residuals for presidential regimes and predominantly positive residuals for
parliamentary regimes. The pre-election politics model of Section 3 had no imme-
diate prediction, but an extension with distortionary taxes suggested that majori-
tarian elections should be associated with larger governments, ceteris paribus. If
this is correct, we should expect negative residuals for countries with proportional
elections and positive residuals for those with majoritarian elections.22
We summarize these predictions at the top of Graph 3. At the bottom, we
display the residuals in each of the four political systems implied by our two-way
empirical classi￿cation (observations are colored in the same way as in the map
of Figure 5). The graph indeed indicates clear support for the post-election pol-
itics prediction: negative residuals dominate for the countries with presidential
regimes (the striped observations to the right), whereas positive residuals domi-
nate for the countries with parliamentary regimes (the solid observations to the
left). It also indicates some, but weaker, support for the pre-electoral politics
prediction; majority elections (darker observations) are associated with positive
residuals, particularly in parliamentary regimes, whereas proportional elections
(lighter observations) are associated with negative residuals, particularly in pres-
idential regimes.
Insert Graph 3 about here
Next, consider the predictions for public good provision. Recall that our post-
election politics model suggested that presidential regimes should be associated
with a smaller supply of public goods than parliamentary regimes. Our pre-
election politics model suggested that majoritarian elections should be associated
with a smaller supply of public goods than proportional elections. We summarize
these predictions at the top of Graph 4. The residuals at the bottom indicate
some support for the latter hypothesis; countries with majoritarian (proportional)
22We are thus implicitly treating our predictions from the two theoretical models as additive,
which is not necessarily appropriate. For instance, our post-election model in Section 4 assumes
majoritarian elections and we do not￿strictly speaking￿know whether its predictions are valid
under proportional elections.
28elections indeed seem associated with negative (positive) residuals. But it is harder
to discern systematic di⁄erences in the regime dimension.
Insert Graph 4 about here
Overall, these graphs support some of the theoretical predictions, though not
all of them. In particular, the residuals suggest that presidential regimes have
smaller governments, and perhaps that majoritarian electoral systems tend to
have less public good provision. But while these graphs are suggestive, they
still leave several questions open. Are the di⁄erences across political regimes
statistically signi￿cant? If so, are the results robust to di⁄erent speci￿cations of
the control variables, and to di⁄erent measures of the dependent variables? If the
political systems are correlated with the controls, how should the covariance with
government spending be attributed? To address these questions, we now turn to
some regression analysis.
5.3. Regression analysis
Table 1 gives a selected set of results from cross-country regressions on govern-
ment size. All equations are estimated with OLS. The dependent variable is total
expenditures, either by central government (columns 1-5), or by general govern-
ment (columns 6 and 7). All regressions include the parsimonious set of control
variables described in the previous subsection, called XB. We also exploit a set of
extended controls XE; that also adds the (log) of population size and our measure
of centralization to XB ( c o l u m n4 ) . F i n a l l y( i nc o l u m n5 ) ,w ei n c l u d eas e to f
dummy variables C for the OECD, Latin America, Asia and Africa.23 The ta-
ble displays the regression coe¢cients for dummy variables re￿ecting the political
system; PRES is set to 1 for presidential and 0 for parliamentary regimes, MAJ
is set to 1 for majoritarian and 0 for proportional elections, MAJPRES is set to
1 for presidential regime cum majoritarian elections and 0 otherwise, and so on.
Numbers within brackets are t-ratios for a test of the null hypothesis that the
corresponding regression coe¢cient is equal to zero. These are estimated using
23We also experimented with other variables, such as a measure of income inequality and the
share of young people in the population, but they were generally statistically insigin￿cant and
did not change any of the results.
29White￿s (1980) consistent estimator.24 Finally, we list the number of observations
and the adjusted R2 for each regression.
Insert Table 1 about here
Our results con￿rm the visual impression from Graph 3. The presidential
dummy is signi￿cant in all speci￿cations. Furthermore, the implied di⁄erences
are substantial; the size of government is about 10 percentage points smaller in
presidential regimes, a large number given that the average size in the sample is
just below 29 per cent. The majoritarian dummy, on the other hand, is smaller in
absolute value and less signi￿cant, though of the expected sign. The speci￿cations,
including a ￿ner classi￿cation of the political system, con￿rm these results.
Table 2 illustrates the results of regressions on public goods. Once more, all
equations are estimated with OLS. The dependent variable is the sum of central
government expenditures on order and safety, transport and education (columns
1-6), or a wider aggregate also incorporating expenditure on health (column 7).
All regressions include the parsimonious set of control variables described in the
previous subsection, ZB. We also use an extended set of controls ZE that adds
to ZB the (log) of population, and the index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization
(columns 5-6), or the set of dummies C for OECD, Latin America, Africa and
Asia (column 6). As in Table 1, we display the regression coe¢cients for dummy
variables indicating the type of political system and the corresponding (White-
adjusted) t-ratios. We also include (column 4) MAJORIT, a continuous measure
of (inverse) proportionality of the electoral system, taking a minimum of 0 and a
maximum of 1.25 T h ee x p e c t e ds i g no ft h ec o e ¢ c i e n to nt h i sv a r i a b l ei st h e r e f o r e
negative.
Insert Table 2 about here
24Standard errors estimated with OLS are not very di⁄erent. The regression results are also
very similar, if observations are weighted by GDP per capita.
25The measure is 1=(Average district magnitude), where Average district magnitude is ob-
tained from the information about the electoral system in Cox (1997). The value of this measure
in our sample ranges from 1
150 in the Netherlands (where all 150 legislators are elected in one
nation-wide district) to 1 in the majoritarian countries (where each legislator is elected in a
single-candidate district).
30Here, the results are more fragile, and do not always con￿rm the visual impres-
sion from Graph 4. The majority dummy, as well as MAJORIT, has a negative
estimated coe¢cient in all speci￿cations but one. The estimate is generally around
-1.5, suggesting that majoritarian elections are associated with a supply of public
goods which is about 1.5 percentage points lower. This, again, is not a negligible
di⁄erence, considering that the average in the sample is just above 8 per cent.
But the estimated coe¢cient is statistically signi￿cant only when the majoritar-
ian dummy is interacted with the presidential dummy, or when the continental
dummies are included. Inspection of the residuals reveals the existence of a large
outlier country, Botswana, a majoritarian parliamentary system with large spend-
ing on public goods. When this country is excluded from the sample (or when the
dummy for Africa is included), the estimated coe¢cients and the t -ratios on the
MAJ dummy and on MAJORIT become more negative, as predicted by the the-
ory, and are statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level. The results are also sensitive
to the speci￿cation, however. As illustrated in column 5, when the set of controls
is expanded to ZE, the political dummy changes signs and does not signi￿cantly
di⁄er from zero. This feature of the evidence does not depend on outlier countries,
and the results do not improve signi￿cantly when Botswana is excluded. Similar
results hold for the broader measure of public goods, as illustrated in the last
column. Finally, the estimated coe¢cients for the presidential dummies generally
have the sign predicted by the theory. But these are only statistically signi￿cant
when interacted with the electoral system. Overall, the evidence from the regres-
sions on public good provision is not inconsistent with the theory but seems too
fragile to draw any reliable inference. The predictions from our models regarding
public goods should thus be investigated further, perhaps with better measures
of public good provision.
6. Closing remarks
Our analysis raises many questions. The empirical results are still preliminary.
Their robustness should be checked more carefully with regard to sample selection,
omitted variables, measurement error, and other statistical problems. Moreover,
additional implications could also be tested, for instance exploiting available data
on government corruption (see in particular the recent work by Mauro (1998)).
We believe, however, that some of the empirical results of this paper are likely to
hold up. In particular, we have con￿dence in the ￿nding that presidential regimes
are associated with smaller governments.
31The two simple models we have studied may re￿ect the current state of the
art, but they fail to capture important aspects of political interactions. For ex-
ample, we treated the pre-election policy announcements and the post-election
policy choices as entirely separate phenomena. It is not obvious how they should
be linked. Under the plausible assumption that binding policy commitments can-
not be made, pre-electoral announcements in￿uence post-election choices only if
they are self-enforcing, due to reputational concerns of some form. But whose
reputation is more important? Generally speaking, we believe that the collective
reputation of political parties is more important than the individual reputation
of single politicians. But this raises another di¢cult question: how should the
collective choices of political parties be modeled? In our analysis, as in virtually
all of the literature, there is no meaningful distinction between a party and a
politician. On a ￿nal point, our models were designed to shed light on the stark
cross-section variation in the data on government spending. Would similar models
be useful in shedding light also on the stark time-series variation we observe in
the same data, particularly the well-documented growth of government and the
expansion of transfer payments in the last 30 years? This is far from obvious.
We intended this lecture to illustrate how we￿as economists￿might embark
upon new research on comparative politics. We believe such research should rely
on solid theoretical foundations and aim at strong empirical content. In our
view, the theory is challenging, but doable. Indeed, researchers have recently
made progress in understanding the consequences of di⁄erent rules for allocating
decision-making authority over legislation and government formation. Empirical
content is essential, in more than one way. Constitutions across the world provide
a great deal of observable variation that can provide precise empirical guidance
when formulating extensive-form game theoretic models. This may help avoid the
￿with-the-right-assumptions-you-can-prove-anything-critique￿, sometimes launched
against game-theoretic research in Industrial Organization. Moreover, the theory
can, and should, be formulated to yield predictions over observable policy vari-
ables. New or better data on political institutions or measures of government
performance may be necessary; but a strong theoretical backing would greatly fa-
cilitate primary data collection. Collaboration between economists and political
scientists on the boundary of our disciplines is also essential. Fortunately, such
collaboration has become more frequent in the last few years.
To us, what lies ahead is a wide-open research agenda. In this lecture, we sug-
gested a possible approach, by deriving testable predictions from some simple the-
oretical models. Even though the empirical results we presented are preliminary,
32we think they are encouraging enough to proceed. We hope to have convinced
other economists that more research on comparative politics is both worthwhile
and exciting.
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￿Œ￿￿ /DUV &DOPIRUVª 8QHPSOR\PHQWæ /DERXU￿0DUNHW 5HIRUP DQG 0RQHWDU\ 8QLRQ￿
ŒŁ SS
￿Ø￿￿ $VVDU /LQGEHFNª 6ZHGLVK /HVVRQV IRU 3RVW￿6RFLDOLVW &RXQWULHV￿ Œ￿ SS￿
￿Ø￿￿ ’RQDOG %UDVKª ,QIODWLRQ 7DUJHWLQJ LQ 1HZ =HDODQGª ([SHULHQFH DQG 3UDFWLFH￿
￿￿ SS￿
￿Øº￿ &ODHV %HUJ DQG 3LRQHHULQJ 3ULFH /HYHO 7DUJHWLQJª 7KH 6ZHGLVK
/DUV -RQXQJª ([SHULHQFH ￿￿Œ￿￿￿￿Œ￿￿ Ł￿ SS￿
￿ØŒ￿ -￿UJHQ YRQ +DJHQª 0RQH\ *URZWK 7DUJHWLQJ￿ ŒØ SS￿
￿ØØ￿ %HQQHWW 7￿ 0F&DOOXP DQG 1RPLQDO ,QFRPH 7DUJHWLQJ LQ DQ 2SHQ￿(FRQRP\
(GZDUG 1HOVRQª 2SWLPL]LQJ 0RGHO￿ Ø￿ SS￿
￿ØŁ￿ $VVDU /LQGEHFNª 6ZHGLVK /HVVRQV IRU 3RVW￿6RFLDOLVW &RXQWULHV￿
Øº SS￿
￿Ø￿￿ /DUV (￿2￿ 6YHQVVRQª ,QIODWLRQ 7DUJHWLQJ DV D 0RQHWDU\ 3ROLF\ 5XOH￿
Ł￿ SS￿
￿Ø￿￿ -RQDV $JHOO DQG 7D[ $UELWUDJH DQG /DERU 6XSSO\￿ ŒŁ SS￿
0DWV 3HUVVRQª
￿Ø￿￿ )UHGHULF 6￿ 0LVKNLQª ,QWHUQDWLRQDO ([SHULHQFHV :LWK ’LIIHUHQW
0RQHWDU\ 3ROLF\ 5HJLPHV￿ Ø￿ SS￿
￿Ø￿￿ -RKQ %￿ 7D\ORUª 7KH 5REXVWQHVV DQG (IILFLHQF\ RI 0RQHWDU\
3ROLF\ 5XOHV DV *XLGHOLQHV IRU ,QWHUHVW 5DWH 6HWWLQJ
E\ 7KH (XURSHDQ &HQWUDO %DQN￿ Œ￿ SS￿
￿Ł￿￿ &KULVWRSKHU -￿ (UFHJæ 7UDGHRIIV %HWZHHQ ,QIODWLRQ DQG 2XWSXW￿*DS
’DOH :￿ +HQGHUVRQ DQG 9DULDQFHV LQ DQ 2SWLPL]LQJ￿$JHQW 0RGHO￿ ØŒ SS￿$QGUHZ 7￿ /HYLQª
￿Ł￿￿ (WLHQQH :DVPHUª /DERU 6XSSO\ ’\QDPLFVæ 8QHPSOR\PHQW DQG
+XPDQ &DSLWDO ,QYHVWPHQWV￿ Œ￿ SS￿
￿Łº￿ ’DURQ $FHPRJOX DQG ,QIRUPDWLRQ $FFXPXODWLRQ LQ ’HYHORSPHQW￿ ØŒ SS￿
)DEUL]LR =LOLERWWLª
￿ŁŒ￿ $UJLD 6ERUGRQHª 3ULFHV DQG 8QLW /DERU &RVWVª $ 1HZ 7HVW RI
3ULFH 6WLFNLQHVV￿ ŒŒ SS￿
￿ŁØ￿ 0DUWLQ )ORGpQ DQG ,GLRV\QFUDWLF 5LVN LQ WKH 8￿6￿ DQG 6ZHGHQª ,V WKHUH
-HVSHU /LQGpª D 5ROH IRU *RYHUQPHQW ,QVXUDQFH" Œ￿ SS￿
￿ŁŁ￿ 7KRPDV 3￿ 7DQJHUnVª 2Q WKH 5ROH RI 3XEOLF 2SLQLRQ 3ROOV LQ 3ROLWLFDO
&RPSHWLWLRQ￿ Œ￿ SS￿
￿Ł￿￿ 3HWHU 6YHGEHUJª ￿Ø￿ 0LOOLRQ 8QGHUQRXULVKHG" 2Q WKH 7\UDQQ\ RI
’HULYLQJ D 1XPEHU￿ Œ￿ SS￿
￿Ł￿￿ /DUV &DOPIRUVª 0DFURHFRQRPLF 3ROLF\æ :DJH 6HWWLQJ DQG (PSOR\PHQW ⁄ :KDW
’LIIHUHQFH ’RHV WKH (08 0DNH" Łº SS￿
￿Ł￿￿ 7RUVWHQ 3HUVVRQ DQG 7KH 6L]H DQG 6FRSH RI *RYHUQPHQWª &RPSDUDWLYH 3ROLWLFV
*XLGR 7DEHOOLQLª ZLWK 5DWLRQDO 3ROLWLFLDQV￿ Ø￿ SS￿